LESSONS FROM HISTORY ON THE LIMITS OF IMPERIALISM: SUCCESSFUL SMALL STATE RESISTANCE TO GREAT POWER AGGRESSION

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to explore the factors involved in successful resistance by smaller, "weaker" nations to larger powers' aggression. I do not contend, of course, that successful resistance is common. History has far more failures than successes in those uneven contests. Yet, it is this fact alone that makes the successes even more instructive. The purpose of this study, however, is not to remind you that David does, occasionally, beat Goliath but to identify the historical elements of successful resistance. My assumption is not that history repeats itself but that historical experience is a useful element in any analysis of contemporary political choices. The examples range from ancient times to the modern era. I will not deny that such an open-ended search often is confronted by dramatically different historical conditions. The Roman invasion of Parthian Mesopotamia in 53 B.C. is not the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, no matter how similar those ill-fated imperialist adventures might seem. The modern relevance lies, I believe, in the questions that one asks of history, not in the answers.

I would like to beg the readers' indulgence to an unorthodox introduction to my topic. I am going to begin with a story of one specific historical imperialist failure but without identifying either countries or time period. While the theatrical quality is meant to peek the reader's curiosity, the serious objective is to illustrate the familiarity of the past. Without doing great harm to the facts, the story as it unfolds contains nearly all the elements that characterized historically successful resistance to great power aggression.

A CASE OF ONE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE TOO MANY

The Great Power in our story has been called by one historian "the best example of political imperialism" of its age.' [I will leave the reader on their honor to forgo peaking at the sources, which surely would give our story away.] Its success was based on indirect rule of many cultures, the success of which depended, in part, on a universal administrative language and a widely accepted, ethical religion. Initially, the "Great Power" had little interest in our featured "Small Power." In any case, for political reasons, the Empire (for that is what it was) recognized a government-in-exile" headed by a former leader of the little state.2 When the latter refused to consider the return of the one-time ruler, the Emperor took the refusal as an insult. Still, such political stubbornness might have been resolved by diplomacy had it not meddled in the affairs of one of the Emperor's unruly client states. Thinking to teach the upstart a less in realpolitik, the Emperor ordered a modest military expedition to invade the offending minor entity, assuming an easy victory. With an inadequate fighting force, hampered by tactical weaknesses and ineffective leadership, the invasion army was met and defeated as it disembarked from its warships. The surviving armada was forced into a humiliating withdrawal.

In the aftermath of their victory, the small state cracked down on anyone suspected of connections to the government-in-exile. In addition, ideological disputes fueled the little power leadership's paranoia, and a number of opposition leaders were exiled, some finding their way to the Imperial capital.3 Under the influence of the ex-patriots self-interested analysis of events, the Empire's intelligence service assumed that an invasion would be aided by popular support from the exiled faction's covert followers. It was to be a serious error in judgment.

Ten years went by after that first defeat. The former leader had passed from the scene but was replaced by his son. The new emperor gathered a large coalition force from his many client states, although the primary infantry and mobile units were mainly veteran imperial soldiers. Unlike the previous expedition, this invasion was well-planned and adequately supplied, with none of the haste and ill-conceived tactics of the earlier fiasco. Despite early military successes, including the taking of the capital city, the invading army met a string of reversals and was forced to retreat. Not withstanding the traditional enmity between small power political factions and the even more serious endemic hostilities with neighboring states, the invading forces were despised as foreigners and met by an alliance of all the region's forces. That unity would last only as long as the foreign invasion threatened their common interests, but it was decisive in the defeat of the Great Power. The latter actually learned from defeat and pursued a more successful foreign policy toward the region based on diplomacy, stealth and intrigue. The small power factions and states resumed their conflicts having, as it turned out, learned very little.

PERSIA AND THE GREEK CITY STATES, 5th CENTURY B.C.

The historical events are well known. Athens's had offended Persia by attempting to aid the rebellious Ionian Greek colony of Persia in what is present-day Turkey. Using as a "legal" justification the invitation of the former Athenian tyrant,4 Hippias, who was head of the government-in-exile, the emperor Darius ordered an invasion of Athens. Athens and their allies defeated the Persia forces at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC. Darius set in motion plans for a return visit to Greece but died in 486, and was replaced by his younger son Xerxes.