Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil

Arceneaux, Craig. Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratisation in the Southern Cone and Brazil. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.

Bounded Missions analyses military rule and transition control. Its goal is "to extend the institutional paradigm to what might be considered a least likely case (military regimes), and thus demonstrate the ubiquity of institutions and the strength of the approach" (p. viii). It attempts to achieve its goal through the study of five cases: the Revolution Argentina (the military's name for its regime of 1966-73), Pinochet's Chile, the Argentine Proceso (1976-83), and the Brazilian and Uruguayan military regimes.

Arceneaux argues that past democratic experiences do not seem relevant for understanding the control that militaries were able to exert during transitions. he also argues that a country's economic situation is of little relevance, using the Chilean and the Brazilian examples. Hence, although Chile suffered a deep economic crisis from 1982 to 1985, the military was able to control the transition. Similarly, Brazil's transition was also controlled by the military although the country was falling into a deep economic recession. Rather, he posits, institutions seem to determine the military's capacity to control a transition. Arceneaux presents a model that rests upon two institutional factors, namely military unity and strategic coordination. Three hypotheses are constructed:

* A military regime with military unity and strategy coordination is likely to effect a controlled transition

* A military regime with military unity but no strategy coordination is likely to transfer power in a balanced transition

* A military regime with neither military unity nor strategy coordination is likely to collapse

He uses the first hypothesis for Chile and Brazil; the second for Uruguay and Argentina (1966-1973), and the third for Argentina (1976-1983).

In this sense, the book presents the reader with a model for analyzing military control over transition processes. The author does not, however, test his model alongside other frameworks. Arceneaux dismisses factors such as past democratic experiences or the impact of economic conditions. There is no analysis of the impact of other civil society actors in influencing the form of transition. The author assumes that all transitions are driven overwhelmingly "from above."

The case of the Revolucidn Argentina is well presented. However, by concentrating so much on the military, the book underplays the relevance of other elements in the process of transition. In this case, the analysis ignores the urban guerrillas that caused two major events: the Cordobazo (the 1969 urban insurrection of workers and students in Cordoba) and the kidnapping of former President E. Aramburu. These events undermined the power of the military and, of course, impacted on the process of transition.

The Chilean transition is an obvious case of military unity and strategy coordination. But Arceneaux's argument about the role of the institutions is controversial. Pinochet's power over the military and his popularity among important sectors of Chilean society are factors that are difficult to ignore when analyzing this transition.

The Argentine Proceso shows that economic factors did play a significant role. The lack of military unity and strategy coordination was not only a problem within the military but also in the relationship between the government and its civilian allies. The 1982 war between Argentina and Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands was a clear example of military disunity and lack of coordination, and is key in understanding the collapse of the Proceso and the transition. However, despite its failures, the military oversaw a transition that lasted 16 months.

The Brazilian case does represent a controlled transition. In fact, it was a long process, gradually designed in a way that allowed the military and political parties to rebuild relations with each other and with civil society in more general terms.

The Uruguayan transition is presented as a case that lacked strategy coordination and was balanced rather than controlled. There was military unity, and different factions were accommodated. Arceneaux argues that the transition was balanced since the military was able to confront the democratic opposition with a united front. It seems that the Uruguayan transition was not controlled from above; rather it was a period when the balance of power between the military and the democratic opposition was in equilibrium. Thus, the regime was able to defend corporate interests. In this case, however, an analysis of the role of political parties during the transition would have enriched the case and helped the reader understand the complexity of the different phases of transition and the role of pacts. The transition began in 1982 with the internal party elections, and achieved a phase of success with the Club Naval pacts between the military and several key parties in 1984. This foundation laid the basis for the national elections, the transition of power, and civil-military relations after the return to democracy. The complexity of the negotiations is only partially addressed in this book since the chapter concentrates mainly on the internal disputes of the military.