Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria

Suberu, Rotimi T. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 247 pp.

The debates over what the character of the Nigerian state should be in the Fourth Republic have been vociferous. The discourses have centered on a number of issues that some scholars and political activists refer to as the national question, "true" federalism, confederacy, inter alia. These conversations issue from the nature of the Nigerian federalism that has been distorted since independence in 1960, first by the political class and second by the military politicians. The issue today is how to eschew the confusion that has stigmatized the polity in order to give it a distinct political form on which to further its development as a cohesive nation-state. Definitionally, federalism is a "system of government in which power is divided by a written constitution between a central government and regional or sub-divisional governments. Both governments act directly upon the people through their officials and laws. Both are supreme within their proper sphere of authority" (Piano and Greenberg 1985, pp. 38-39). It is on these general themes that the volume rests.

Larry Diamond wrote the forward to this book (pp. xi-xviii) that is based on seven chapters. Chapter one serves as the substructure of the volume by historicizing the study. The British colonial administration designed and operated a unitary form of government in Nigeria but left the country at independence with a federal system (p. 2). London's later desire to opt for federalism was informed by the fears of the North that had expressed misgivings about British intention to unite the relatively less developed North with the more advanced South.

To some extent, the genesis of the evolution of Nigerian federalism had its roots in political economy, when religio-cultural and educational dissimilarities in the system are controlled. The North was popular for its groundnut pyramids, the West for its cocoa production and the East for its palm-kernel and palm-oil production. The desire to control the wealth that accrued from these resources in the regions influenced the crafters of the pre-independence 1954 federal constitution (p. 25). In the political developments that followed this constitution and subsequent constitutions (for example, 1960 and 1963), emphases were placed on strong regional governments (in Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu). The military coup of 1966, and the ensuing civil war of 1967-1970, created political imbroglio in that while the Ironsi administration created a unitary form of government, the Gowon administration that followed the demise of Ironsi returned the government to a federal system on paper, since Gowon's activities and those of the succeeding military regimes mimicked a unitary form of government (pp. 30-31). In cases in which the central government devolved powers to the subordinate tiers of government, it was done directly to the local governments using the center's power of the purse (p. 34), thus circumventing and diminishing the influence of the state in local government affairs (p. 40). But the states are much closer to the local governments than the central government. Moreover, the political instability in the system did not help to further the development of "true federalism" since the assumption on the part of the military cast was that only a strong center could hold the country together following internal political conflict and inter-ethnic clashes generally over scarce resources (p. 41).

The spirited debate on the practice of true federalism in Nigeria flows in part from the problematic revenue sharing formula (pp. 47-48). The center controls a lion's share of the national wealth to the chagrin of the areas that house the resources. And, according to K. C. Wheare, if the sub-national units are co-ordinate with the center in a federal system of government (Birch, 1956, p. 9), the implementation of the policy of derivation, which states that a substantial amount of revenue derived from a state, for example, should be retained by that state, is imperative (p. 63). Yet, the central government remains adamant in its reluctance to carry through with the principle of derivation for fear that it could lose its power of the purse and control over the federation (p. 71).

The assumption that the creation of more states in the country could strengthen the federal system was advocated by the Ironsi administration but his unitary rule contradicted this objective (p.85). Indeed, the plotters of the coup that toppled Ironsi and his monistic ideology argued that the administration's policies were inimical to the interest of the North that was pro-federalism. Thus, by creating twelve states the Gowon administration not only assumed that it was strengthening the federation but also attempted to address the concerns and fears of ethnic minority groups of domination (Udogu, 1990, p. 164). The strategy of creating states (now 36) in Nigeria by the military regimes has been largely political and diversionary. It has not been done in attempts to promote a genuine federal system (pp. 89-92).