A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years

Kochavi, Noam. A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 279 pp.

Because Camelot attracted the brightest and the best, its policies were heralded as flawless and true, but this book exposes John F. Kennedy and his New Frontiersmen to the light of reality by intensely examining the Kennedy administration's China policy. Since there is no other comprehensive treatment of Kennedy's China policy, Kochavi's book is a welcome addition. It covers Kennedy's thinking and leadership style, probes his team's handling of the China policy within international and domestic contexts, and offers a succinct, multi-level appraisal of his administration's performance and policy.

Kochavi begins by addressing the Eisenhower legacy, which had displayed belligerence toward China and created an atmosphere of profound suspicion, reducing communication to a minimum. With this baggage in hand, the Kennedy team had a daunting task ahead of it. Moreover, as a Cold War warrior prior to his presidency, Kennedy blamed previous administrations (Roosevelt's and Truman's), in addition to sympathizers like the "Lattimores and the Fairbanks," for the Chinese Communist Party's victory in China. He was concerned about the shadow of Munich and any potential "domino effect" in Asia. These predispositions severely constricted the administration's ability to forge a policy that was not hostile to China.

Nevertheless, a mood of restraint would prevail in Kennedy's presidency, due to a complex set of factors. Kennedy worried that the China Lobby and the "China Bloc" on Capitol Hill might smear him for being too "soft" on China. His narrow margin of victory in the 1960 election weakened his mandate for any dramatic policy change. The continuing debate over the loss of China in the early 1950s, the Bay of Pigs fiasco (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the lingering issue of Laos, the Sino-Indian border war (1962), and concerns about repeating the Korean War scenario were in the minds of Kennedy and Rusk, his secretary of state. This might explain why his intent to stage a preemptive strike against China's nuclear R&D facilities in 1963 did not move beyond the stage of discussion.

Kennedy favored a less structured policy making process than the one that prevailed during the Eisenhower administration, giving his aides, his "ears and eyes," more latitude in conducting policy debates over various strategies, such as the "carrot and stick" approach and the "pressure wedge" approach, when it came to dealing with China. As in most US administrations, the Kennedy team also found itself bogged down in multi-layered bureaucratic competitions. The overall impression of the debates recounted in this study is one of constant disagreements over the correct assessment of the Chinese threat and of appropriate responses. Any forward-looking policy deemed to be controversial or politically suicidal seems to have ended up on the shelf. On the other hand, these repeated requests for a reassessment of US-China policy made by these "revisionists" in the Kennedy years did sow the seeds of Nixon's opening of China in 1971.

In matters of China policy, the escalatory spirals of misunderstandings, mistakes, and missteps could not be laid solely at the feet of the Kennedy administration. Mao's perception/misperception of US policy and the revolutionary rhetoric of the time, laced with fanaticism, simply made matters worse. China's own domestic struggles, economic hardships, and famines also made meaningful contacts with the US difficult.

This study also covers a broad range of related topics, such as the issue of Taiwan's independence, the relationship between Kennedy's China policy and the Vietnam war, the implications of China policy on Asia, the "who should represent China" question and the "Outer Mongolia" membership issue in the UN, and the administration's play of India and Japan against China. A review of this length does not permit a full assessment of Kochavi's extensive and detailed analyses. There is much to gain from this intellectually stimulating book, although it cannot hope to have the final word on controversial issues such as the proposed preemptive strikes against China's nuclear facilities during the Kennedy years.

In accordance with the Chinese expression, "picking bones from egg yokes," it can be pointed out that the book gives quite limited attention to original sources from China and Taiwan. The depiction of US policies is solidly constructed upon a wealth of US primary sources, while the examination of the Chinese side relies on works of well-established scholars. This hardly invalidates the conclusions drawn about China, but the paucity of original research on the Chinese side is not a particular strength either. One regrets that Taiwan's primary sources are not represented as well because Taiwan, as an officially recognized entity by the Kennedy administration, was a crucial player in Kennedy's policy deliberation. A more exhaustive study of documentary sources in Taiwan might have shed a different light on the usual depiction of leaders in Taipei as being like the intransigent "mule who walked into the brick wall" or as hopelessly unrealistic in their "liberation of China" schemes. As more newly declassified archives become available, this book should benefit immensely from the comparison of notes between sources on all sides of the China policy debates.