Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant

Osaghae, Eghosa, E. Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998. 342 pp.

Too often contemporary works on modern Nigeria have tended, perhaps understandably given the country's turbulent experience as an independent nation-state, to be overly pessimistic about the future. The conclusions range from the extremist position that the country will continue to face a bleak future in the twenty-first century unless it goes through a fundamental revolution to the more moderate stance that its future is, at best, uncertain (Nwachuku, 1976). Thus, Wole Soyinka,in a recent jeremiad, castigates Nigeria as Africa's "open sore" and holds out no promise of fundamental change in the future (Soyinka, 1996);and Chinua Achebe, in an earlier savage analysis of the Nigerian condition, having noted that Nigerians "have lost the twentieth century"-clearly a deliberate exaggeration- goes on to ask rhetorically: "are we [Nigerians] bent on seeing that our children also lose the twenty-first? God forbid!" (Achebe, 1983:3). Four years later R. A. Joseph was emboldened to describe Nigeria as both a "prebendal" state (1987) and later as a "dismal tunnel" (1996). A prebendal state is described as a state in which individuals abuse their governmental positions and resources for personal ends as well as for ethnic, regional and religious considerations. This notion, apparently adapted from Max Weber, fails somehow to point out that if Nigeria is a prebendal state as Joseph and P. M. Levis (1996) conceived it, then more than three-quarters of the existing states in the world have prebendalist attributes. In reality, the adjective "prebendal" is unhelpful in describing Nigeria or any other country for that matter. As far as I am aware, a prebend is a sort of subsistence allowance or stipend which Medieval European Christian states granted to deserving institutions or individuals for performing some functions, or which a cathedral granted to a clergyman. This increasingly careless and insensitive use of words especially in "Third World" studies is a problem that needs to be addressed. Equally seriously, the prebendalist notion, even in the sense that modern political scientists use it, fails to take account of the external factors which have had, and continue to have, a considerable impact on the development of the Nigerian condition. It is to his credit that the author notes this palpable omission (p. 313).

Eghosa E. Osaghae's Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant follows this tradition of critical and irreverent scholarship which pays scant attention to the meaning and implications of words. Thus, describing Nigeria as a crippled giant, eye-catching and interesting as it may sound, raises nevertheless some issues. First, is Nigeria really a giant and if so in what respect? And secondly, if Nigeria is really a giant which became crippled, the implication is that it will never walk again except through some sort of miracle or divine intervention! Is this prediction really true? It can, of course, be argued that far from being conceived as a crippled giant Nigeria can be more profitably studied as a populous and richly endowed African country which has been struggling since 1960 against the twin forces of internal malformations and international neocolonialism. Although these forces have inflicted on Nigeria horrendous injustice, they have not been able to cripple it. One of the great attributes of the Nigerian state is its capacity to bend but not break, largely because of its leaders' uncanny ability to always stop short of the brink.

I do not believe that the author would disagree with the approach suggested above. Indeed, in the first page of the preface, he asks the question, "What is really the trouble with Nigeria?" (p. ix), obviously echoing Chinua Achebe. He then proceeds to point out correctly that "the character of Nigerian politics [read state] since independence .... may be summarized as a long-- drawn-out decay or decline, whose empirical elements are political instability, a low level of national cohesion and economic crisis, all of which are mutually reinforcing." (p. 13). He notes also quite correctly, that "many of the post-independence socio-political and economic formations and malformations are a direct consequence of state building and economic integration processes begun under colonial rule." (p. 1). Working from this premise, the author takes us through Nigeria's troubled journey since regaining independence from British colonial overrule on October 1,1960. This journey which begins with the First Republic headed by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966) ends in 1996 when Sani Abacha was still in office. Except for the short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983), Nigeria was under a military dictatorship between 1966 and 1996 when the book terminates.

The author's treatment of his subject is informed, detailed and, for the most part, fair. Although he covers familiar ground and adds nothing new to our knowledge, he nevertheless brings together, for the first time, a formidable array of scattered information from secondary sources. Except for Anthony KirkGreen's and Douglas Rimmer's Nigeria Since 1970 published in London almost twenty years ago, there has been no comprehensive historical account of contemporary Nigeria before Osaghae's book. It is also interesting that the author seems to be unaware of the existence of this work. Okon Uya's edited work on contemporary Nigeria (Buenos Aires, 1992) which he consulted is a collection of thematic essays. It should also be pointed out that Osaghae did no archival work; no oral interviews were attempted. The result is that the real "official mind" of the successive Nigerian governments is obscured. It is also worth noting that what is essentially a comprehensive history of contemporary Nigeria devotes only three pages (pp. 65-68) to the Nigerian Civil War, indubitably the most traumatic and significant historical event during the period that he covers. That the author has nothing meaningful to say about the war is a lost opportunity. In a sense this is not surprising because Nigerian scholars, usually noted for their loquacity and swashbuckling confidence, have tended to suffer from an unaccustomed amnesia whenever the issue of Biafra is raised. But deal with it eventually they must because the problems highlighted by the Biafrans have remained largely unaddressed and have continued to plague the nation-state.