Democratic institutions and civil-military relations: The case of Chile

INTRODUCTION

In December 1999, Chileans cast their votes in a presidential election, the third time they have done so since the end of the military government of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). Pinochet himself retired in 1998 and has been harried by house arrest in England as a result of judicial proceedings against him in Spain.1 Given such major historical changes, we would expect that political institutions in Chile are becoming quite effective in channeling and dealing with military concerns. But how effective are they? This article analyzes the four main political institutions that mediate civil-military relations in Chile: the Defense Ministry, the National Security Council, Congress, and the Judiciary.

The construction and/or resuscitation of institutions has been a crucial part of building democratic political systems. The military regimes that once ruled Latin America are fading ever more into the past. In some cases, such as Ecuador, an entire generation has grown up not knowing military rule at all. Yet, interestingly, even though the military no longer governs Latin American countries, the scholarly debate over civil-military relations in the region has rarely been as nonconsensual. In particular, we face the question of whether or not civilian leaders have been successful in building and reinforcing political institutions, especially in a postauthoritarian context. Studies of different countries can examine the same situation and come to very different conclusions.2 Often, different studies appear simply to speak past one another.

The intent of this article is to speak directly to the central debate, namely the effectiveness of democratic institutions in the postauthoritarian era. Political institutions can have an independent impact on political outcomes, and therefore deserve further attention. Given the importance of institutions in determining policy, a useful strategy is to examine those formal institutions that mediate civil-military relations. By "effective" we mean whether the military accepts that formal institutions are the only appropriate avenues for expressing opinions, concerns, and/or suggestions with regard to military policy.

INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL ACTORS

In a commonly noted definition, March and Olsen characterize institutions as "collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations."3 As such, institutions mediate between political actors. Rules govern these relationships. The scope of action of each actor is thus well-defined and fairly.predictable in any given situation. If institutions are effective, then all involved in political decision-making know the roles of all other political participants and the manner in which those decisions will be reached and ultimately implemented.

These institutions are not often transitory. Considerable effort must be expended to construct them, which means they cannot be demolished easily. Consequently they become part of the political landscape. As they become entrenched, more and more they structure the ways in which different political actors behave. Over time, not only do they mediate but they can also help define political actors' goals.4

The application of the "new" or "historical institutionalism" is novel for the study of civil-military relations. It represents an interesting avenue of inquiry, since civilian supremacy over the military depends so much on the ability of civilians to compel the military to accept decisions and to follow the rules that each institution carries with it. In the absence of effective rules, the military (as well as all other political actors) proceeds in an ad hoc manner to pursue its various interests, leaving civilians off balance and less able to respond effectively.

Pion-Berlin's institutional analysis of Argentina is therefore interesting.5 His thesis is provocative because it contradicts the many analysts who argue that continuity characterizes civil-military relations in Latin America and that the armed forces have retained significant political influence even after leaving power. Instead, he argues, those analyses fail to recognize the importance of democratic institutions. Those institutions were constructed precisely to limit the military's political influence to only those areas where such influence was widely considered legitimate. For example, few would expect U.S. military to miss the chance to flex its political muscles to lobby congress for weapons procurement or other issues related to professional development, and so, he argues, we should not expect differently from any other military establishment.

In particular, high levels of institutional autonomy and concentration of authority lead to the strengthening of civilian policy makers.6

Therefore, military behavior may be conditioned by institutions. As long as the armed forces follow institutional rules, then exerting pressure for or against certain policies will not necessarily be detrimental to civilian governance. Institutions thus stand between the military and its policy goals. Although the institutional process will be predictable, the outcome will not.