national question: Issues and lessons of boundary adjustment in Nigeria--The Ndoki Case, The

By Okere Steve Nwosu*

INTRODUCTION

Through accidents of history, several ethnic groups, each with its own culture, language, social and political systems, have been brought together to form what is now the Nigerian nation. The Nigerian national question, therefore, refers to the peculiar composition of the nation, the dynamic problem of how to order relations among the different ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups in Nigeria so that they can conveniently have access to power and participate in equitable distribution of national resources. Beyond these, the national question highlights such issues as minority interests, ethnicity, citizenship, state creation and local governments, as well as unsettled issues of revenue allocation.

At political independence in 1960, Nigeria was a fledging democracy identified with structural imbalances. The circumstances which led to the creation of states in 1967 centered on the national question, specifically, on the structural imbalances of the federal system. State creation was construed to be a strong move to address such imbalances. But the move raised new national issues, particularly that of administrative boundaries. The boundaries between given political units became uncertain and contentious. Some ethnic communities considered themselves highly disadvantaged by being located in a particular state. Others felt strongly that boundaries within a given state should be redrawn in order to ensure convenience and ease of development.

Altogether, fifty-five boundary disputes were identified. Out of this total number, fifty were inter-state boundary disputes in nineteen states, while five were intra-state. Ndoki was one of the fifty disputes. These led to the creation of the 1976 Boundary Adjustment Commission to identify all boundary disputes with regard to creation of states and to make recommendations to the government accordingly. Because its Chairman was Justice M. Nasir, it was known as the `Nasir Commission'.

In almost all of these cases, boundaries were demarcated based on such variables as 'stability', 'oil', `national interests', 'security' and `good government'. These reasons are, essentially, tenuous. They failed to address basic economic issues that caused political disabilities on the basis of which agitations were made for boundary adjustments. The effort to emphasize geographic features, such as rivers, as appropriate demarcators of frontiers, has not served the intended purpose. The emphasis appeared to be the creation of viable centers of regional economic development, rather than the creation of ethnic strongholds. Even so, the problem has persisted unresolved. There have been rival claims to farmlands between different ethnic groups on both sides of the Cross River and Benue, Akwa Ibom and Abia, and Cross River and Enugu States. Within the Rivers State, inter-communal disputes and bloody clashes have continued which entailed police and military actions, and even refugee problems in areas in which the Nasir Commission was assumed to have created conditions for peaceful coexistence. The situation questions the rationale behind the various boundaries, raises old feelings, and arouses new sentiments, all reflecting the crisis of Nigerian pluralism, and the continuity and dynamism of the national question.

This paper will, therefore, try to provide answers to the following questions: What basic issues conditioned boundary agitations? What ulterior motives influenced decisions on them? How relevant are the lessons of the adjustment to the basis of social coexistence of Nigerians? In answering these questions, Ndoki will be used as a case in point. In doing so, we shall show that multiplicity of conflicting group interests created not only social but regional disabilities and encouraged the emergence of ethno-regionally based individuals and groups who influenced public policy. This was not common and uniform in all the regions and sub-regions of Nigeria.

Historically, lack of equity and justice in economic relations, in the distribution of socio-economic resources and in locating facilities have resulted in ethno-regional imbalances, social inequalities and exclusions. These differential variables add up and worsen existing ethnic rivalry at the frontier zones. The justification of this study is, therefore, underscored by the crisis of federalism in Nigeria, the continuity of the problem of conflict between groups and the almost intractable quest to formulate a desirable model of coexistence, equity and tolerance.

BASIS OF CONFLICT

Often, conflict is explained in Nigeria in terms of ethnic pluralism, in which diversity of culture and institutional practice occur, and where divergences cluster to demarcate distinct and closed social sections.1 By 1914, more than 300 ethnic groups had been brought together to create one political and economic unit under British administration and control. From the 1952-53 census, Nigeria had a population of 31 million people, made up of Hausa-Fulani, 8.5 million; Ibos, 5 million; and Yorubas, 4.5 million.2 The `big three' indigenous groups accounted for about 18 million people or 58% of the colony's total population. These three groups outnumbered 297 other ethnic groups which were transformed into the 'minorities'. As shown by Fapohunda, ten ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Kanuri, Tv, Edo, Nupe, Ibibio and Ijaw) accounted for nearly 80 percent of Nigeria's population in 1963.(3) The then Eastern Region of Nigeria had a population of about 8 million in 1953. The majority of the people of the Eastern Region were Ibos (5 million); the rest of the region was made up of the Efik, Ibibios, Ijaws, and Ogonis.4 The Ibos, thus, formed a regional majority. The Ndokis, members of the Ibo ethnic group, had a population of only 35,000 in 1953.(5)