Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, The

Loveman, Brian and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., (eds.). The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1997.426 p.

Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. have revised and updated their classical edited collection, and it remains a valuable contribution to the literature on military power and democracy in Latin America. The book contains primary sources such as excerpts from U.S. military documents and speeches by Latin American generals explaining their rationales for coups and military rule, complemented by chapters by renowned scholars in the field, including the editors themselves, Frederick M. Nunn on European influences upon the militaries, Robert Potash and Juan E. Corradi on Argentina, Frank D. McCann, Jr., Ronald M. Schneider, and Riordan Roett on Brazil, and many others. The book takes us up to the present-day "redemocratizations" in the region. All the chapters are of consistently high quality; I highlight only a few here.

The editors employ their concept of "antipolitics" to frame the collection. They posit that the militaries have long despised the chaos and instability, corruption and division, class conflict and disorder, spawned by "politics" (demagogic politicians, party squabbling). As they note, "In much of Latin America, professional military officers concluded that only an end to 'politics' and the establishment of long-term military rule could provide the basis for modernization, economic development, and political stability" (p. 3). Military officers who viewed themselves as the repository of the highest values of the nation acted to impose order and progress. They rejected politics as "the source of underdevelopment, corruption, and evil" (p. 13).

The concept of antipolitics is an interesting one, if somewhat Orwellian, as the editors show. For despite their claims to stand above politics, the armed forces were not politically neutral actors. One important point made by Loveman and Davies is that, contrary to some analyses, professionalization did not achieve depoliticization of the militaries; in fact, the contrary was often true (p. 29), an irony given the concept of "antipolitics." Juan Peron, for example, had "highly political antipolitical appeal" (p. 58). Later, as the Cold War deepened, the armed forces in the region became increasingly politicized. Encouraged by French and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines and training, they began to envision themselves as the front line of defense against international communism and internal subversion in a new worldwide crusade that greatly expanded traditional concepts of the military mission. Liberal democracies were overthrown because they were insufficiently anticommunist or excessively pluralist (that is, they tolerated voices demanding social change). A key aim of military repression was to depoliticize and demobilize politically-active populations, particularly leftists, peasant and labor movements, and intellectuals, usually supported by conservative political and economic elites whose interests and privileges were well-served. In short, these were hardly apolitical acts. To paraphrase Loveman, the armed forces claimed the right to "protect democracy from itself" (p. 379).

The chapters by U.S. national security strategists expound perceptions of threat and advocacy of politicized war that mirror those of the Latin American generals. The 1962 excerpt by W.W. Rostow, essentially a defense of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, includes his well-known definition of communism "as a disease of the transition to modernization." (As Corradi points out in his incisive contribution, the imagery of disease and "social pathology" also permeated the language of Latin American officers (p. 230) and provided a justification for military "surgery"). Colonel John D. Waghelstein promotes post-Vietnam counterinsurgency (or low-intensity warfare) doctrines and illuminates the rift within the U.S. army between proponents of these strategies and conventional warfare champions. Exactly 30 years after Rostow's article, three U.S. military officers explain SOUTHCOM (United States Southern Command) priorities, including supporting counterdrug efforts and "enhancing the role of the military in the democracies of Central and South America" as well as assisting with counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. Reflecting similar assumptions to those of the 1960s, U.S. doctrine as expressed in this selection never questions the wisdom of "enhancing the role of the military" in countries struggling to establish (or re-establish) democratic institutions and exert civilian control of still-politicized military institutions.

The Latin American military speeches provide a window into military ideology and mind-sets and present much material for analysis by students of Latin American politics. Corradi's perceptive anatomy of the Argentine military state (1976-1983), first published in 1982-83, is still one of the best. In just a few pages of vivid and compact prose he captures the ideology and functioning of the military state, its social and psychological impact on society, and its combined use of terror and free market mechanisms to disarticulate and destroy the old social and political bases of Argentine society. Another excellent chapter is by Knut Walter and Philip J. Williams, who incisively dissect the complexities of military power and political opposition in El Salvador. As they explain, the military increasingly penetrated the state after the transition to civilian rule in the 1980s. The authors point out that the military prerogatives enshrined in the 1983 Constitution, including defense of democracy, amount to "hand[ing] over the keys of the nursery" (p. 335) to the armed forces. Their analysis of the dangers of pact-making as a means of transition is also on the mark (340-341). Loveman's contributions too are insightful in their detailing of the "residual sovereignty" of the militaries throughout the region after transitions from authoritarian rule (Chapters 23, 27, 28) and the impact of guardian structures and legalized prerogatives upon democratization processes. The legacies of military rule have altered the very meaning of democracy, he notes: "the concept of democracy ha[s] been pared to the bone: selecting presidents and legislators through elections" (p. 368). Varying forms of "protected democracy" exhibit military infiltration in key political areas (Loveman provides manifest evidence), impairing civilian authority, constraining liberties and rights, and impeding democratization in the region. As he notes, "Without sweeping revision or repeal of national security, antiterrorist, and public order laws, Latin American democracy will remain hostage to its military guardians" (p. 387).