Old World Charms, and Alarms: Understanding those difficult Europeans

From sea to shining sea, the cry goes up: "Why are the Europeans so awful? Why do they nitpick at the U.S., in between intervals of being saved by America from totalitarianism? Why are they already turning sour on the war on terrorism? What's wrong with the SOBs?"

Whole libraries, written mainly by Europeans, have been devoted to this theme. It offers a rich field of inquiry. So it may seem eccentric to begin by casting doubt, or at least qualification, on its main premise; but it must be done, for in the post-September 11 crisis the Europeans have not been as bad as you might think from a cursory glance.

First of all, it's not true that in fighting the war on terrorism, America is "alone." Almost every European nation offered help, including military help, shortly after the hijacked planes hit the World Trade Center. British, French, Turkish, and other NATO troops are in Afghanistan policing the cease-fire, and a small German fleet, with up to 1,800 sailors, is stationed off the Horn of Africa, ready to assist the U.S. if it should intervene in Somalia. It is true that the military heavy lifting in Afghanistan was done principally by the U.S., the Northern Alliance, and a small number of British special forces -- but that's because the U.S. needed little help, and refused most European offers.

It is also true that the Europeans, having radically reduced defense expenditures, have little useful to offer -- a serious drawback, but not evidence of hostility to the U.S. And even the upsurge of European (especially British) indignation at the allegedly harsh treatment of detainees in Cuba -- which seems to have been the main catalyst for American indignation towards Europe -- looks different in the daylight. Given the apparently shocking photographs released by the Pentagon without a sensible explanation, the initial humanitarian reaction was not unreasonable. It was transformed into an anti-American fiesta by a few newspapers, but most of these fell silent or retracted when their own reporters visited Cuba and reported on the comfortable conditions there. Those journalists who kept up the barrage of accusations were either the usual anti-American suspects left over from the Cold War or overextended hacks seeking to defend their initial error. Throughout this brouhaha, the British government maintained officially that its own investigation had found the detainees to be decently cared for. And the British public, according to polls, approved of their treatment by the astounding margin of 89-11 percent. In short, it is absurd to portray America as a lonely Atlas. If Atlas is indeed lonely, that is because he is so much taller than everyone else.

Another complaint is that President Bush's declaration of war on the "axis of evil" has been subjected to skeptical criticism by Europeans. True enough. But there is nothing wrong -- and a lot right -- with that. If governments are asked for moral or practical support in what might become a military action against sovereign powers, they have a positive duty to ask such questions as: "What exactly do you intend to do? How much support can you count on from neighboring powers for military action? What defense or counterattack is the axis capable of mounting?" And so on. If such questions have not already been asked (and answered) within the U.S. administration, then the Europeans do us a favor by asking them now, before we have irrevocably committed ourselves. If such questions have been asked (and answered), as I believe, then we should have no great difficulty in persuading them that we are acting prudently. Americans would have cause for complaint if they reasonably suspected that European skepticism was a disguise for determined opposition; but there is no evidence as yet that Europeans have done anything more than raise serious questions about a genuinely bold and therefore controversial proposal.

Furthermore, the irritation of some Americans at such questions arises from what a critic of Hemingway once called "false hair on the chest" - - the unworthy tendency in American popular culture to regard all doubts, hesitations, and second thoughts as a disguise for cowardice. If Europeans save us from miscalculation, however irritatingly "sophisticated" they may sound in doing so, we are in their debt.

These qualifications having been established, let me now concede that many Europeans have, indeed, recovered their usual hostility to the U.S. as their initial sympathetic reaction to September 11 has worn off. They have been grudging in their support for the U.S. war effort, quick to find (or suspect) faults, and both supercilious and condescending in their frequent criticisms of U.S. "arrogance" and "unilateralism."

These annoying tendencies, moreover, are plainly not accidental but rooted in differences of political culture. On issues as various as arms control and the deference owed to international bodies such as the U.N., most (continental) Europeans see things differently from most Americans.