Campaign 2000: From This Moment On - George W. Bush's presidential campaign - Brief Article

'WE have two newly established leaders in the Republican party," says Sen. Chuck Hagel, a supporter of John McCain, adding that George W. Bush and McCain "together will lead the Republican party." Well, no. For McCain to have established himself as a Republican leader, he would have had to get Republican votes in the primaries. This he signally failed to do. He did not get a majority of Republicans in any primary. Often, Bush beat him by 2-to-1 or 3-to-1.

Still, McCain attracted some independent voters and Democrats, and winning the "McCain vote" is said to be the key to the election. Bush is being counseled that he must move in McCain's direction by taking up campaign-finance reform. But Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew poll, has pointed out the flaw in this analysis: There is no McCain vote. McCain's supporters do not constitute a bloc that can be defined by ideology, demographics, or shared interests.

It was McCain's persona that fueled his campaign: the scrappy insurgent, the stand-up guy, the POW, the penitent pol. In the exit polls, very few voters said they had made their decision based on campaign-finance reform. What many voters were looking for was a candidate who stood up for his beliefs. These voters went heavily for McCain. Gore and Bush were both seen, by majorities in their respective parties, as people who did not say what they believed. Bush will gain a reputation for steadfastness if he argues with passion for causes in which he does believe-tax cuts, missile defense, accountability for schools-even when the TV people say those causes are unpopular.

Bush will not improve his reputation by an opportunistic embrace of campaign-finance reforms he has heretofore denounced. Reverting to "compassionate conservatism" will not help either, as it sounds like an attempt to be all things to all people; it is soft rather than scrappy. Both of those flawed alternatives, however, start from a correct premise: The existing Republican coalition and a conventionally conservative campaign will not suffice to win a national election.

Bush can expand the coalition by adopting elements of McCain's insurgent style. He could lead a crusade, for instance, against welfare for corporations that make more than a million dollars in profits. But since McCain's supporters are not a bloc vote, Bush will need to attract more clearly defined groups, groups that may not even have existed when Ronald Reagan created the present Republican coalition. There are millions of new investors who would like the

federal government to stop heaping taxes on them for trying to build a future for their families-and who will not take kindly to any suggestion by Gore that cutting those taxes would be risky or selfish. In today's entrepreneurial economy, independent contractors could also use some relief from federal burdens.

New Economy voters want an Internet free of special taxes, a commitment that Bush has not yet made. They favor free trade, which Bush can support more strongly than Gore can. They may also be receptive to the idea that the gales of creative destruction that have ripped through the private sector should touch the federal government as well. If Bush promises to scrap its 16 pay grades and scores of antiquated programs, he will both expose the insignificance of Gore's "Reinventing Government" project and pin Gore to an unattractive status quo. Like McCain, he will have a bold reform plan that poses no threat to voters.

Finally, Bush needs to keep an eye on Patrick Buchanan, stealing his best ideas (such as support for teaching all American children English) and attacking his worst ones (taxing international commerce). Isolate Buchanan on the left, where he can poach union members from Gore's coalition.

The best campaign strategy imaginable, however, will not change the likelihood that Gore will have peace and prosperity on his side in November. But as Kate O'Beirne points out in this issue, he is a weak candidate. Bush was able to maintain a lead over Gore in the polls even during the most bruising days of the primary season. Gore's political instincts are shaky. He is attacking Reaganomics, gun rights, and religious conservatives-the precise strategy that the Democrats adopted in the 1994 campaign that lost them Congress. In touting campaign-finance reform, Gore seems to be misreading McCain's success; and unlike McCain, Gore explicitly supports public financing of campaigns, a deeply unpopular idea.

Bush can win this election-by making new friends, not betraying old ones.

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