Hostagegate?

Hostagegate?

WHEN THE 100th Congress convenes in January, it will unleash a barrage of televised hearings on the Reagan Administration's covert dealings with Iran. The whole controversy will boil down to two questions: What did the Administration do, and why did it do it?

It is possible, after all, that the NSC was engaged in a more subtle, delicate, and ultimately justifiable operation than now meets the eye. Obtaining the eventual release of hostages in Lebanon may have been only one objective of the operation, as NSC advisor John Poindexter has hinted in a briefing to key congressmen.

There are sound strategic arguments in favor of quiet U.S. contacts with Iran. However unsavory its present regime, Iran remains a country of pivotal importance in the region--a crucial firebreak against further Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf. Prudent preparation for the inevitable post-Khomeini Iran would include initiating low-key contacts with certain moderate officials in the government. The Administration perhaps felt justified in using such contacts to encourage Iran to exert its influence on behalf of U.S. hostages in Lebanon--not as part of a deal, either explicit or implicit, but as one step in a complex diplomatic board game in which neither side relates its moves directly to those of the other.

The unsentimental Israelis have dealt clandestinely with Khomeini for years, despite his avowed intent to destroy Israel. Tel Aviv knows that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend,' and that Iraq poses a far more immediate treat to Israeli security than Iran does. It is highly probable that any shipments of U.S.-made spare parts received by Iran in connection with (but not in exchange for) the release of hostages Jacobsen and Weir actually originated in Israel and were only loosely coordinated with the NSC.

If some variation of this scenario is what occurred, then the Administration's actions hardly rank as outrageous, though reasonable men might differ as to their wisdom. If, however, this was an outright swap of arms for hostages then it deserves to be denounced as a betrayal of Reagan's principle of not dealing with terrorists.

COPYRIGHT 1986 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning