The State Department v. the freedom-fighters

THE STATE DEPARTMENT V. THE FREEDOM-FIGHTERS

DURING THE 1970s and the early 1980s, anti-Communist resistance movements erupted throughout the Soviet empire. One of Ronald Reagan's more significant initiatives was his latching onto this development to make it the centerpiece of a new "post-Vietnam-era" foreign policy. The subtleties of what has come to the called--not by Reagan--the Reagan Doctrine have yet to be defined, but the cornerstone of the policy is support for the insurgencies.

Ironically, the most damaging opposition to this policy has come from within Reagan's own State Department. Even congressional liberals have been more cooperative: At least some liberal-Democratic congressmen support each of the resistance movements; the State Department at one point or another has effectively opposed, or at least resisted aiding, all of them. In general, State cooperates only when maximum presidential attention is focused on a particular insurgency. Thus, in the recent past, State has opposed or obstructed aid to the anti-Communist resistance group in Cambodia, the Renamo guerrillas in Mozambique, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola, and the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. Lately State has been helpful to the Contra forces in Nicaragua; but before Central America became a top priority for the President, some offices in State were actively undermining resistance to the Sandinistas.

Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has become a particular bete noire of anti-Communist supporters of the Reagan policy. There is a certain irony here, fot at the beginning of Reagan's first term, Crocker (then director of African studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies) was singled out in The Conservative Decade by James C. Roberts--a movement conservative--as "one of the best" among a "number of superbly qualified analysts of a conservative cast" at the center.

Yet by Reagan's second term, Crocker's handling of policy for southern Africa (i.e., Angola and Mozambique) had come to symbolize, for most conservatives, State's sabotage of the anti-Communist insurgencies. Under Crocker, State's policy has been to ignore or disparage the opportunities presented by UNITA and Renamo. Instead, his efforts have centered on an attempt to "constructively engage" Angola's Marxist MPLA regime into sending home some 35,000 Cuban troops in exchange for South African withdrawal from Namibia (itself threatened by the Marxist, MPLA-backed SWAPO).

THESE NEGOTIATIONS have been going on for almost five years. So far they have not removed a single Cuban soldier from Angolan soil. In fact, during this whole period, the number of Cuban troops and other East-bloc personnel in Angola has steadily increased. Yet each year the State Department has claimed that the negotiations were on the verge of a major agreement. This year, conservative congressman Jim Courter (R., N.J.) points out, "the critical point in negotiations came in early March, when President Botha [of South Africa] offered the Angolan MPLA what has in essence been its own negotiating position: South African withdrawal from Namibia in exchange for Cuban withdrawal from Angola. [MPLA boss Jose Eduardo] dos Santos turned it down. That proves his talk is cheap, and it indicates that without the Cubans his government would fall."

Did this convince State that negotiations had collapsed, and that it should perhaps consider actively seeking military aid for Savimbi and UNITA, at the very least to push dos Santos toward serious negotiations? After all, I pointed out to a State Department spokesman, this is U.S. policy in Nicaragua--to support military aid for the Contras in order to force the Sandinistas into genuine negotiations.

"I won't draw that comparison," my spokesman from State said. Furthermore, the talks with the MPLA had not collapsed: "It is incorrect to say [that the Angolan government] rejected Botha's offer." How so, since there has yet to be any agreement by the Angolan Marxists to withdraw Cuban troops? Where is the positive sign? "They [the MPLA] have accepted the principle of linkage. In 1984, they agreed to withdraw twenty thousand Cuban troops in three years in exchange for immediate implementation of UN Resolution 435 [South African withdrawal from Namibia], to be completed in a year. This was not acceptable to the U.S., but it showed the MPLA, in principle, accepted linkage." It was a relief to hear that the hard-as-nails realists at State turned down a deal that would have (at best) legt half the Cubans in Angola in exchange for turning Namibia over to the SWAPO Communists.

President Reagan has said that the "starting point" for any negotiations to settle regional conflicts such as the one in Angola is the inclusion of all the warring parties. I asked my spokesman if Savimbi was a party to the Angolan talks. Savimbi is "consulted," I was told--which means no.