The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society

THERE is no doubt that the philosophical outlook called communitarianism has influenced politics in the West. Some of its major tenets have been advanced by Bill Clinton in America and Tony Blair in Britain. Described by its promoters as a "movement" (it's not: it has no popular support or mass membership), communitarianism is a public philosophy developed by a small coterie of academics who have attempted to recast American liberal-Left and European social-democratic ideologies into a new "centrist" mold.

In his latest book, sociologist Amitai Etzioni, communitarianism's founder and chief advocate, outlines his vision of the good society. According to Etzioni we should build and sustain a "community of communities." In his "communitarian paradigm," the American nation is composed of "member communities" or "constituting communities" which have distinct traditions, cultures, values, and in some cases, languages. At the same time, these communities share some core values and are part of an "encompassing whole." The key is to maintain balance between the moral order ("shared values") and autonomy for "member communities" ("women, minorities, ethnics") and individuals.

Etzioni's good society is symbolized by the "mosaic" in which constituting communities (the "pieces") are glued together by shared values (the "frame"). He insists that "members of the constituting communities need to combine . . . commitment to their own particular traditions, cultures, and values with respect for those of others." Beyond respect among the constituting communities, society needs a "thick normative framework of shared values."

Commitment to democracy is crucial, and the "Constitution embodies core values." But Etzioni tells us these values do not constitute a "canon" transmitted through generations; instead the "substantive normative content of the framework continually adapts to changing balances within the society." Thus, the Supreme Court constantly reinterprets the Constitution, and the shared normative framework is always being "recast."

Mr. Etzioni's communitarian paradigm suggests little grounding in or respect for American liberal democracy and its core traditions. American liberal democracy is founded on individual citizenship, majority rule within the context of limited government, separation of powers, federalism, and a healthy civil society composed of voluntary associations. Moreover, as Washington declared, Tocqueville observed, and Clinton and Gingrich have recently repeated, the moral foundation of the American Republic has always rested upon religious belief.

Etzioni would "recast" all of this with a new regime, a mosaic democracy. Groups formed on the basis of ascribed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and gender are to be given quasi-constitutional status as constituting communities. Etzioni rejects as neither "practical" nor "desirable" the notion that "we should have a color-blind society, or that we should treat people only as individuals and not as members of groups." He explicitly criticizes the concept of "E Pluribus Unum" because it leaves "no room for pluralism as a permanent feature of a diverse yet unified society." Apparently, distinct ethnic/linguistic member communities are to be "permanent," but the principles of the United States Constitution are to be continually "recast." Attempts by the author to qualify these concepts (individuals should belong to many communities and bond across them) lead back to an emphasis on permanent multiculturalism: e.g., foreign languages should be promoted for the purpose of maintaining the constituting communities.

Etizoni's paradigm differs considerably from Alexis de Tocqueville's famous conception of American civil society. While Tocqueville distinguishes between permanent associations "created by law" (townships, cities, counties) and voluntary associations whose existence is "solely due to the initiative of individuals," Etzioni blurs this crucial distinction between the federal system and civil society by lumping local governments, professional associations, and ethnic/linguistic groups together under the rubric of constituting communities.

Furthermore, he misuses Tocqueville by implying that racial and ethnic communities are part of the Frenchman's concept of "intermediary bodies" that stand between the American state and the individual. Finally, Tocqueville insists that religion is central to morality in America, while Etzioni downplays the connection between morality and religion and suggests that secular consensus-building, reconciliation, cross-cultural communication, and megalogue are what is required to recast shared moral values.

It is significant that this book fails completely to understand the nature of the culture war. Without a clear understanding of this phenomenon, the debates over civil society, morality, diversity, and democracy are incomprehensible. Yet Etzioni characterizes the contemporary cultural conflict as an unfortunate series of problems put on the national agenda by boorish and uncivil social conservatives who have the bad taste to raise divisive issues. In fact, it is a more than thirty-year-old war of aggression waged against traditional values in most areas of American society -- in politics, education, the arts, morality, and religion. There is a culture war because there is resistance to this aggression. If the resistance ceased, there would be no culture war and the aggressors' conquest would be complete. This is, of course, the goal of those who call for a truce or an end to the culture war.