Re-engaging Saddam

SOME 18 months late, the Gulf War allies are moving to protect the people of southern Iraq from Saddam Hussein's air force. This is the first decisive step in our Iraq policy since the 2992 establishment of the Kurdish enclave in the north. It allows the people of that region, particularly Saddam's foes, to grab at least a breath of free air, directly and indirectly undermining his power; it recaptures the initiative for the first time since Mr. Bush called a ceasefire; and it places the initiative firmly in the hands of people who (unlike the UN inspection team) are willing and able to respond rapidly and forcefully to his counter-moves.

Critics, particularly in the Arab states, warn that the partial partitioning of Iraq could destabilize the region; in fact the region will not be truly stable while Saddam or his regime remains in power. The status quo is unstable. If left to itself it will re-stabilize only when Saddam has reamed, quite possibly with nukes, and established a regional hegemony. Others warn of a quagmire: escalation that leads to U.S. ground forces being pinned down amidst a hostile population. Such an outcome is certainly possible-even probable, if the Administration returned to its indecisive ways, groping at half-solutions.

More broadly, the move itself makes sense only as part of a far-reaching strategy. Saddam's options are limited: he can accept the loss of sovereignty or fight it. Our options are both broader and more favorable. We can launch air strikes against Saddam's ground forces in the area, establish local governments independent of his will, and coordinate action between those forces, the Kurds in the North, and opposition forces in central Iraq. Other steps would follow logically, the ultimate end being either partition or the elimination of the Baath regime.

In the months leading up to the Gulf War, President Bush executed a strategy of comparable boldness. It was strikingly successful. Mr. Bush should learn from his success.

COPYRIGHT 1992 National Review, Inc.
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