A look inside the Iranian sponsored terrorism machine

IF A MILITARY OPERATION is enacted to solve the problem of the Iranian nuclear program, is there any real threat of a wave of terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Europe? The answer is yes. Of course, it is extremely difficult to assess terrorist activities which, by their nature, are extremely secretive. Yet, there are a few signs that "something" likely will occur if things turn badly.

As a risk and strategic assessment center, we work daily with intelligence and security agencies in Europe as well as other parts of the globe, including the Arab world. This opportunity provides us an access to some classified intelligence. Obviously, I cannot be extremely precise in these elements. Nevertheless, I can state that the intelligence community in Europe has, at least in some countries belonging to the EU, some clear indications that, in the last 12 months or so, the Iranian secret service and the Pasdaran--I will explain later how those two organizations work--have deployed new human resources in Europe, both in the Iranian embassies and outside those embassies. We assess that they have doubled or tripled their intelligence capacities in some embassies.

We also know that, in some European countries, they have increased the recruitments of sympathizers while trying to penetrate some mosques that are well known to shelter extremist activities. It is interesting to note that those efforts are not focused on the Shia minority, which is extremely weak in Europe, but on the Sunni community, which forms the vast majority of the Muslims in Europe. Actually, this is reminiscent of a situation we faced more than 25 years ago. Just after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was considered as the beacon of radical Islam in the world, and the Iranian envoys converted a lot of Sunni from Maghreb descent to the Chrism in some countries in Europe. At the time, they specifically targeted the Moroccan communities in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. Today, they still conduct most of their intelligence and recruiting operations in Northern Europe, but also in Italy. However, it is quite impossible to assess how successful those operations are. but we know that the Iranians are working in some mosques in Europe and we know they try to recruit new activists.

We also know they conducted some reconnaissance missions on possible flash points in various European countries in recent months. Those possible targets include industrial facilities, "critical infrastructure," and nuclear power stations. It is clear that, if the Iranian nuclear program is the tar-get of an assault, retaliating by attacking nuclear power makes sense. We know, too, that Hezbollah has increased its capacities--logistical and operational--considerably since the summer. The goal of Hezbollah is obvious--put itself in the position to attack in Europe if things evolve badly for it in South Lebanon. This, though, is not Hezbollah's only task. It has another mission as well, given directly by its Iranian godfather--to serve as a propaganda and terrorist tool for Tehran.

At this point, I must elaborate on the way the Iranian intelligence and special services work. First off, it has to be made clear that the Iranian mullahs consider intelligence and terrorism as very serious matters, and they handle it at the highest possible level. At the apex of the Iranian security community is the Joint Committee for Special Operations, formed by the president and the top religious authorities and senior security officials, including representatives of the Pasdaran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, of course, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This is a clear sign that the intelligence activities routinely are integrated in the general framework of Iranian diplomacy and foreign actions. As its name indicates, the Joint Committee coordinates all the Iranian intelligence and special operations.

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MOIS generally is considered by the Western intelligence community to be the most important ministry in Iran. It posts hundreds of agents abroad, under diplomatic or even unofficial (students, businessmen, etc.) cover. Responsible for most of the MOIS activities is the Velayat-e Faqih apparatus of Ali Khamenei, the Guide of the Islamic Revolution. MOIS has many missions, from illegal acquisition of technologies to classical military and political spying through surveillance and penetration of the Iranian communities and opposition movements abroad. It also is responsible for intelligence collection to support terrorist operations.

Then there is the Pasdaran, or Guardians of the Revolution, also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or IRG. The IRG is an extremely fascinating organization in that it is typical of a totalitarian state, comparable to the German SS between 1933-45. Please understand, I am not trying to compare the current Iranian regime to the Nazis, yet it is interesting to note that the Nazi regime did not feel very secure or comfortable with its army, the Wermacht, so it created an ideological army, the Schutzstaffel (meaning Protection Force or Defense Squad). The SS began as bodyguards to Adolf Hitler and his associates. After January 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor and the Nazis took power, they were in charge of security inside Germany and of intelligence and special operations abroad. The SS was an ideological as well as military tool, completely and fanatically devoted to the protection of the regime. This is exactly what the Pasdaran does.