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The Arab perspective of the 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah: the Egyptian Strategic Research Center al-Ahram Annual Strategic Report
Infantry Magazine, March-April, 2008 by Youssef Aboul-Enein
The United States has been involved in the global war on terrorism for more than six years, yet the importance of reading what Arab intellectuals, analysts and security officials are saying about regional conflicts remains elusive for many American military planners. It is vital that we assess and highlight Arabic books of military significance to understand not only our adversary, but also those Arab governments who assist in the fight against terrorism. Egypt's al-Ahram Center for Strategic Research based in Cairo publishes an annual report on the impact of crises, policy decisions both external and internal to the region, and changes of government that take an overall holistic approach to the problems stretching from Iran to North Africa. This Arabic tome is eagerly awaited by political and security analysts in the region and is read by serious Arab academics on terrorism, military affairs, and regional national security issues. The 2005-2006 volume will be the subject of this review essay and will focus on the eagerly anticipated chapter on Israel's war with Hezbollah.
This article is designed to provide American military readers with the Arab perspective of this war, and it is highly recommended that Arabic, Hebrew, English, and European sources be studied and read to gain an overall appreciation of the 33-day conflict between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shiite militant group Hezbollah. This is important because many experts believe this conflict will flare up again in the near future. Studying this particular conflict is important for American military leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, as it represents the future types of insurgency warfare that has become the staple of the 21st century American way of war. There is no question that Israel's adversaries--Syria, Iran, and Palestinian rejectionist groups--will eagerly study the reaction and response of Israel to Hezbollah's tactics. Even as you read this essay, Hezbollah is likely rearming itself in preparation for a future confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah is acquiring weapons systems that no doubt will reflect what they have learned in fighting the Israelis. Arabic books of military significance represent the cutting edge of what should be the focus in educating America's future military leaders; however, we ignore such books written by friends and foes of the region at our peril.
Lebanon's Machiavellian Political Landscape
On the eve of the war between Hezbollah and the IDF, there were political stressors within Lebanon as a result of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. These stressors altered the status of Syria's hegemony over Lebanon after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and Lebanese politics coalesced into two major blocks, which were clearly evident within Lebanon's Majlis al-Nuwab (Parliament). One faction was made up of the Mustaqbal (Future) Party led by the Prime Minister Hariri's son Saad Eddine, the Socialist Progressive Party led by Walid Jumblatt, and the Action Party led by Samir Geagea. This block was unified by their anti-Syrian stance and the removal of Lebanon's President Emile Lahoud, who simply ignored the constitutional precedent that set presidential term-limits and remained Lebanon's president at the behest of Syria. Opposing this faction was the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, Hezbollah led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Amal led by Nabih Berri, and the Free Nationalists led by Colonel Michel Aoun. Their platform was to maintain arms and resistance as long as the Israelis occupy the Sheba Farms. Note that Lebanese Christians are divided into both camps, the Action Party and Free Nationalist, while the Druze, which were represented by the Socialist Progressive Party, are in the Hariri (Sunni) anti-Syria camp. Hezbollah and Amal both represent Shiite interests and are in the Lahoud pro-Syria camp. There are those in Lebanon, primarily within the current government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the anti-Syrian coalition, who believe Hezbollah attempted to break the deadlock between these two political blocks by introducing a new dynamic when it kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers. The book highlights internal pressures within Hezbollah to obtain the release of its guerillas from Israeli captivity. Of interest is that when Hezbollah kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers (Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser), Lebanese politician Suleiman Franjieh, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Lebanese Baathists all expressed support for Hezbollah tipping the balance between the two coalitions. When Hezbollah engaged the Israelis by kidnapping two of their soldiers, the Lebanese government and its armed forces saw in this the opportunity to assert control over South Lebanon once Hezbollah was weakened by what was expected to be a route undertaken by Israeli forces.
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Arabs in the region refer to the 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah as the Sixth Arab-Israeli War. The kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers represented an opportunity to remove Hezbollah from Lebanon's political equation, using force as a means of restructuring a weakened Hezbollah within Lebanon's fractious political factions that were divided into anti and pro-Syrian camps. Israel tactically has to address the number of Hezbollah rockets fired in North Israeli towns and settlements. Israeli Chief of Staff General Danny Halutz, who rose through the ranks of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to become commander of the IAF, was heavily influenced by his service. His staff drew up a list of Hezbollah targets that included bases, electrical grids, media outlets, and water stations. After extensive IAF bombardment, ground forces would push Hezbollah north of the Litani River with armor and mechanized infantry. The IDF planned a 20-40 kilometer buffer zone, sanitizing the area and cutting off Iranian and Syrian resupply of Hezbollah.